United Nations A/70/818–S/2016/317

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 97
General and complete disarmament

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 4 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Kazakhstan has been fully committed to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security since the first day of its independence. We recognize that the threat of the use of nuclear weapons by State and non-State actors remains one of the main challenges that humanity faces today. My country will therefore use every opportunity to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. We also acknowledge the role of the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the main international structures responsible for nuclear security and safety.

At the same time, the Nuclear Security Summits have contributed significantly to and supported the United Nations and IAEA in accomplishing the common goal of a safe and secure world. Our President has participated in all four Summits, and we thank the Government of the United States and its President, Barack Obama, for their initiative to launch the Summit process. We are confident that implementing the recommendations adopted at the Summits in Washington, D.C., Seoul, The Hague and last week, again in Washington, D.C., will greatly increase nuclear security worldwide. For our part, Kazakhstan will spare no efforts to realize them.

I therefore have the honour to submit herewith a fundamentally new security paradigm document authored by Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, entitled "Manifesto: the world, the twenty-first century", put forward at the fourth Nuclear Security Summit (see annex).* This is a landmark milestone that expresses the momentous stand on the issues of war and peace, in particular the threat of a nuclear apocalypse in the event of the failure of the international community to promote and advance a total ban on nuclear weapons.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of General Assembly, under agenda item 97, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kairat **Abdrakhmanov**
Ambassador

* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 4 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Manifesto: the world, the twenty-first century

by President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan

April 2016

Humanity hoped that the twenty-first century would herald a new era of global cooperation. This, however, may turn out to be a mirage. Our world is once again in danger and the risks cannot be underestimated.

The threat is a deadly war on a global scale.

Our civilization, by scholars' estimates, has survived more than 15,000 wars, approximately 3 every year. Hundreds of millions of people have died, cities and countries have been destroyed and cultures and civilizations have vanished. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, stunning scientific discoveries are being made and new technologies are being invented. The world is on the verge of the fourth Industrial Revolution. Many horrific diseases are being successfully eradicated. But the virus of war continues to poison the international situation. It drives the military-industrial complex, which, in some countries, has become the most powerful sector of the economy. It may even, in the future, infect the development of artificial intelligence. Militarism has deeply penetrated our minds and behaviour. There are more than 1 billion small firearms in the hands of people. Thousands of civilians die every day from their use. We cannot exclude the risk that this military threat could become a tragic reality on a global scale. We can see the signs of such a terrible outcome. In international relations, the risk of conflict has increased. Conflict has engulfed the historic battlegrounds of the two world wars: Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is not fulfilling its purpose. Nuclear weapons and the technology that produces them have spread all over the world due to double standards of the main Powers. It may be just a matter of time before they fall into the hands of terrorists. International terrorism has gained a more sinister character. It has moved from isolated acts in individual countries to large-scale terrorist aggression across Europe, Asia and Africa. The exodus of millions of refugees and the destruction of sites and historic monuments have become an everyday reality. Economic sanctions and trade wars are commonplace. Our planet is now on the edge of a new cold war, which could have devastating consequences for all humankind. This threatens the achievements of the past four decades. As a result of successful negotiations, the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia have been reduced substantially. Five nuclear Powers have announced and kept a moratorium on nuclear-weapons testing. The process of forming regional security systems has accelerated. A unique and comprehensive security structure, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, was created on the principles of mutual trust. Coordinated action between world Powers and United Nations peacekeeping operations saw many conflicts end. However, today we are witnessing the erosion of these international security achievements. This is an increasing and serious concern for millions of people.

How will the world situation develop? Could the tensions between the leading world Powers escalate into a new long-term confrontation? Which country could be the next victim of the so-called "proxy wars" between the world and regional Powers? Which territory, flourishing for now, will be torn apart by tank tracks and explosive shells? In which cities will children die under heavy rocket fire? From where and to where will the refugees fleeing conflicts migrate next? More than 60 years ago, two prominent scientists, Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell, presented their manifesto, in which they asked "a dreadful but an inescapable question: shall we put an end to the human race or will mankind be able to renounce war?"

The most brilliant minds of the twentieth century have warned the people that, in a future world war, nuclear weapons will inevitably be used, leading to the destruction of all life on our planet. Their demand that disputes between countries cannot and should not be resolved by military means remains hugely relevant in the twenty-first century. To end all wars is the most challenging task for our civilization. But there is no other reasonable alternative. This task has to be treated by world leaders as the highest priority on the global agenda. In the twenty-first century, humanity must take decisive steps towards demilitarization. We will not get another chance. If this objective is not achieved, our planet will end as a graveyard of radioactive materials. Our planet is unique. We have no other home.

It is why we need a new comprehensive programme: "Twenty-first century: a world without wars".

Through this global strategy, we need to identify joint and responsible actions to be taken by all nations in order to destroy the virus of war. This document should be based on three main principles. First, there will be no winners in any modern war; everyone would be on the losing side. Second, a new war will inevitably entail the use of weapons of mass destruction. This will lead to the destruction of all humankind. It will be too late to argue over who is responsible for this catastrophe. This threat must be understood by all current and future national leaders and politicians. Third, the main tool for resolving all disputes between States should be peaceful dialogue and constructive negotiations on the basis of equal responsibility for peace and security, mutual respect and non-interference in domestic affairs. Taking all this into consideration, the world community must take comprehensive action towards these goals.

First, there must be gradual progress to a world free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. An important step, to which Kazakhstan made a significant contribution, has already been taken in the right direction. On 7 December 2015, the General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration for the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, put forward by Kazakhstan. Twenty-five years ago, Kazakhstan permanently closed the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. We were the first and, for now, only such country to take this action. Our newly independent State then voluntarily renounced the world's fourth largest arsenal of nuclear weapons: the menacing legacy of the collapsed Soviet Union. These decisions triggered a moratorium on conducting nuclear tests by world nuclear Powers. Twenty years ago, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was developed in the United Nations and put forward to Member States to sign, but has still to come into force. Under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Kazakhstan is to host the low-enriched uranium bank on its territory, which will allow countries to develop civilian nuclear energy. Global nuclear security

summits are of great importance. We now need global decisions to prohibit deploying lethal weapons in outer space, on the seabed and in international waters of the world's oceans, as well as in the Arctic. We should develop and adopt international binding agreements to ban the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction through new scientific discoveries. It is necessary to create a register in the United Nations of such scientific developments, which could be used for the creation and advancement of weapons of mass destruction.

Second, we must build on and expand existing geographical initiatives to gradually eliminate war as a way of life. There are already six nuclear-weapon-free zones in the world. They encompass Antarctica and virtually the entire southern hemisphere, including Latin America, Africa, Australia and Oceania. The newest is a zone free of nuclear weapons in Central Asia, created 10 years ago in Semipalatinsk by five States of the region. Now we must intensify international efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In 1992, Kazakhstan put forward the initiative to convene the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia. This century, the forum has been successfully institutionalized, with the participation of 26 Member States of the continent, the United Nations and other international organizations. Multilateral cooperation among the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan within the activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has had a positive impact. Peace zones in South America, the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean have significant potential. We should bring together these initiatives to create global areas of peace based on a special international law. Issues of security and development in these areas of peace could be guaranteed by all the States Members of the United Nations and the Security Council.

Third, it is necessary to eliminate such relics of the cold war as military blocs, which threaten global security and impede broader international cooperation. Geopolitical reality means that, when one military bloc is established and developed, an opposing bloc will be created. Power generates anti-power. Military blocs can include countries that are not always aware of their responsibility to promote peace and security. We have also seen attempts by some States to use the protection of military blocs to their advantage in their interactions with third countries, including immediate neighbours. It is how confrontation can be infinitely cloned in different regions and globally. We should also have learned from past wars and conflicts that it is impossible to ensure our own security by undermining the security of others. That is why a global coalition of States for peace, stability, trust and security under United Nations auspices should be set up against military blocs. Our common task for the next decade should be to end wars and conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic and eastern Ukraine, as well as the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation. We must reduce the dangerous potential of the situations on the Korean Peninsula, the basin of the South China Sea and the Arctic.

Fourth, it is important to adapt the international disarmament process to the new historic conditions. A short-sighted dismantlement of previous treaty limitations on anti-missile systems and conventional arms has resulted in militarization in the political space of Eurasia. This increases the risk of a new global war, even by the possible failure of electronic defence management systems. We need a new strategy for the Conference on Disarmament. The world needs to

eliminate the new threat of cybercrime, which can become a very dangerous weapon if used by terrorists.

Fifth, a world without war requires primarily fair global competition in international trade, finance and development. At the seventieth session of the General Assembly, Kazakhstan proposed the development of a 2045 global strategic initiative plan. Its main goal is to eliminate the root causes of wars and conflicts. This can best be achieved through equal and fair access to infrastructure, resources and markets for all nations. The plan should be implemented in time for the 100th anniversary of the United Nations, in 2045. Kazakhstan proposes to convene a high-level United Nations conference in 2016. At this conference, we should confirm the basic principles of international law to prevent devastating wars and conflicts in the twenty-first century.

Calls for reason and dialogue, restraint and common sense should not be the targets of attacks by those opposing global peace. In the twenty-first century, we all need peace. This is a key mission of our time. Peace is worth fighting for, just as deliberately and persistently as did people in the past century. We should think hard about the future of our children and grandchildren. We must combine the efforts of Governments, politicians, scientists, entrepreneurs, artists and millions of people around the world in order to prevent a repetition of tragic mistakes of past centuries and spare the world from the threat of war. Failing to act or putting limits on efforts to promote peace risks global catastrophe.

My manifesto, "The world, the twenty-first century", reflects a sincere concern for the fate of future generations who will live and work in the coming decades. We, the leaders of States and politicians, bear an enormous responsibility for the future of humanity. As an individual who went through hardship and difficulties, and as a statesman who made a difficult decision to close the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site and renounce nuclear weapons, I urgently call on world leaders and the entire international community to listen to reason. We need to do our utmost to free humanity from the threat of deadly wars forever. There is no more important goal.

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 34
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 5 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a statement issued on 3 April 2016 by a spokesperson for the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with regard to the hostile policy pursued by the United States against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see annex).*

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ja Song Nam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 5 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement issued by a spokesperson for the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Pyongyang, April 3 (KCNA) -- The spokesperson for the National Defence Commission (NDC) of the DPRK issued a statement on Sunday, 3 April 2016 in connection with the fact that the U.S. and other hostile forces are making last-ditch efforts to attack the former in a flock to swallow it up.

The statement said:

The U.S. and hostile forces' frantic racket to stifle the DPRK has reached an unprecedented phase.

The Leningrad blockade which struck terror into the hearts of people as a pronoun of the harshest sanction in the world history of wars and the Caribbean crisis in the Cold War era can hardly stand comparison with the situation prevailing on the Korean peninsula at present.

What is ridiculous is that the U.S. is still not aware that the hostility it has persistently pursued towards the DPRK for over a century since the start of its stand-off with the latter is so anachronistic and suicidal one that it precipitates its self-destruction.

It is a hard reality that the U.S. illegal "high-profile sanctions" reinforces the persevering will of the servicepersons and people of the DPRK, the former's outrageous military pressure makes them hold more tightly Songun as an all-powerful treasured sword to annihilate the enemies and the former's terrible moves to "bring down the social system" prompt the latter to make a giant leap forward in the drive to build the greatest power in the world.

Those, who blindly yielded to the brigandish demands of the U.S. which lorded it over our planet through high-handed and arbitrary practices, domination and hegemony and backed it in its hostile moves against the DPRK veiled with "UN resolution," made a mess of their precious legacy and tradition for which nothing can compensate.

The NDC of the DPRK would like to tell the whole world what consequences the U.S. and its followers' reckless hostile moves against the DPRK have brought to this land through a fierce uncompromising confrontation between independence and subjugation, justice and injustice and progress and reactionary.

The brigandish U.S. imperialists and their allies' barbarous "harshest sanctions" to completely stifle the DPRK economically turned Juche Korea into a matchless great power based on the principle of independence, self-reliance and self-development.

The U.S. imperialists' unprecedented moves for a war of aggression against the DPRK to stifle it militarily created the worst crisis in which it may make a retaliatory nuclear strike at the U.S. mainland any moment.

The U.S. and its allies' moves to "bring down the social system of the DPRK" by splitting and destabilizing it are entailing the consequences of reducing the rotten and ailing capitalist system to dregs of history as it has lived out its days.

Though all hues of hostile forces in the world come in attack on the DPRK with desperate efforts, they can never hold in check the dynamic advance of the great Paektusan nation along the Songun highway of sure victory under the leadership of the peerless Songun brilliant commander.

Mankind will be pleased to see how the great Paektusan nation will remain shining as a beacon of independence and symbol of justice and truth.

United Nations A/70/820–S/2016/313

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 34
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 4 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith the remarks of Serzh Sargsyan, President of Armenia, delivered on 4 April 2016 at the meeting with ambassadors of the participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (see annex), in connection with the pre-planned and unprecedented provocation along the entire line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh, undertaken by Azerbaijan since 2 April, in which it carried out massive military actions with the employment of their entire arsenal: armoured vehicles, heavy artillery and air force.

I kindly request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-06591 (E) 260416

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Annex to the letter dated 4 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Opening remarks by Serzh Sargsyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, at the meeting with the ambassadors of the participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to provide them with information regarding the situation on the line of contact

4 April 2016, Yerevan

I appreciate your quick response to my invitation and thank you for being here. I am confident that all of you are informed about the situation on the Nagorno-Karabakh line of contact. The purpose of inviting the ambassadors of the participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is to provide you with first-hand information.

As you already know, over the night of 2 April 2016, at around 3 a.m., the Azeri side undertook a pre-planned and unprecedented provocation along the entire line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh, carrying out massive military actions and employing the entire complex of their arsenal: armoured vehicles, heavy artillery and air force.

From the first hours of the hostilities, the adversary also targeted civilians. Schoolchildren were killed and wounded in the school yard; elderly people were viciously killed in their homes — all of them peaceful residents, including a 92-year-old woman. And it was carried out by the so-called sabotage and reconnaissance group because no regular unit of the Azeri armed forces entered any residential area. It is true that, right after this, the group was eliminated; however, this is the fact. Footage featuring this scene also appeared in the mass media yesterday. You can watch that footage and juxtapose it with the repeatedly uttered words of the leader of the neighbouring State on the protection of the rights of the people of Karabakh within "the island of tolerance — Azerbaijan".

Timely and professional actions of the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army allowed the entire situation to be brought under control.

Hostilities of this magnitude have not been registered since the establishment of the ceasefire in 1994. Provocative attacks of the Azeri side resumed the next morning and continue as we speak. Azerbaijan continues to target civilians, using multiple rocket launchers and mortars. After the so-called "unilateral ceasefire", the Azerbaijani armed forces continued their active military actions along the line of contact and shelled the residential areas of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Republic of Armenia, as a party to the 1994 ceasefire agreement, will continue to fully implement its obligations to ensure the security of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, I have instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to work with Nagorno-Karabakh to elaborate an agreement on mutual military assistance. And here I would like to state what I have declared on many occasions: should military actions continue and escalate to a large scale, the Republic of Armenia will recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Further escalation of the military actions may result in unpredictable and irreversible consequences, including an all-out war. It will obviously affect the security and stability not only of the South Caucasus but also of the entire European area.

Clearly, the cessation of hostilities and a peaceful resolution of the issue, in general, stem from the interests of the European States. OSCE, as a structure which plays a crucial role in preserving security in Europe, has a special role.

Regrettably, multiple warnings of the Armenian side that, sooner or later, Azerbaijan would become hostage to its own Armenophobic rhetoric and would plunge into a new military adventurism, and that, therefore, the aggressor must be contained by all possible means, fell short of desirable results. When Azerbaijan was bragging about the acquisition of arms and weaponry in profound quantities, the international community remained silent or almost silent; when statements about seeking a military solution to the problem were being made at the highest levels, the international community remained almost silent; when Azerbaijan was derailing the work of the OSCE Minsk Group and turning down the proposals to create confidence-building mechanisms, the international community again kept silent. And today, the international community is again silent as we see how Azerbaijan uses heavy artillery and bombards the peaceful population. By the way, literally minutes ago the Azeri armed forces for the first time used the heavy flamethrower system, "ognemyot" in Russian. The type is called TOS-1. Meanwhile, when the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army is taking countermeasures against the armed forces of Azerbaijan, which has manifold numerical superiority over Nagorno-Karabakh, they are urged to "show restraint."

I have three messages I would like you to convey to your capitals.

First, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan — not only this ministry but also obviously the speech of the President of Azerbaijan and other official sources have publicly stated, that for some reasons, which are perhaps clear to them but do not echo the logic of the so-far occurring processes in any way, Azerbaijan was the one that had initiated the offensive. According to their explanations, Azerbaijan attacked the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic to resolve problems that assumingly had to be addressed through the peaceful talks under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs. We expect all the parties concerned with regional peace to clearly demand an explanation from Baku concerning the launch of the military operations.

In recent days, many heads of State and international organizations expressed their concern over the situation and made statements calling for the establishment of peace. They cannot be effective as long as they are not directed to a specific addressee, the one who provoked the offensive, and as long as they do not foresee consequences for disregarding them. This is exactly why I refer to the international community as being silent.

Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are in favour of hostilities being ceased and the 1994 ceasefire regime being fully respected, with all the parties returning to their initial positions and barracks as of 1 April 2016. To preserve the ceasefire, OSCE needs to come up with stabilizing measures, which, under these conditions, should primarily include the urgent introduction of the ceasefire violations investigation mechanism and a considerable increase in the monitoring capacities of

the personal representative to the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office. It is also necessary to increase the number of field assistants to the personal representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in the conflict zone so that they can record the violations.

Second, I have repeatedly stated that, to settle any conflict, especially when it is a conflict concerning the destiny of peoples fighting for their right to self-determination, it is necessary to address the cause of the conflict, and only after that to proceed to other matters stemming from that cause.

The Armenian side has never declined reasonable concessions to resolve the conflict. The OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs and the ambassadors of those countries who are present here are well aware of this. But talking about them is meaningful only when the root cause of the conflict is solved and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is freed from the threat of being recolonized. No one can force a people to live within a State that does not reflect the aspirations and values of that people.

Third, one of the recent manifestations of the cynical behaviour of Azerbaijan was the statement of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence, according to which Azerbaijan unilaterally suspended the "counteroffensive" against the "enemy", owing to the humanitarian concerns and started implementing the programme of fortifying the protection of the "liberated" territories. I can assure you that Azerbaijan has not liberated any territory. At this moment, along the whole line of contact, there is only a tiny segment in the south and another tiny segment in the north, which hopefully will no longer exist by the end of this meeting. This means that Azerbaijan has made an advance of merely 200-300 metres. For every metre they have lost more than one person. It is obvious that, by this, Azerbaijan is again misleading the international community and trying to create preconditions to disguise both the hostilities it has unleashed and the further continuation thereof.

An alleged "unilateral ceasefire" is out of question, since the tripartite agreements on the ceasefire from 1994 and on the strengthening of the ceasefire regime from 1995 without time limits, signed by Azerbaijan, are in force and Azerbaijan must adhere to the letter and spirit of those documents as an international obligation and not as a gesture of goodwill. By the way, I believe that the mediators of the ceasefire have an important role to play. I think that they are also the guarantors of the preservation of the ceasefire regime. Nagorno-Karabakh is a party to those documents and Azerbaijan must start to speak directly with the authorities of Karabakh whether they like them or not. Moreover, I believe that every incident of violation of the ceasefire must be thoroughly examined and evaluated since that is the guarantee and motivation of an effective negotiation process.

As an OSCE participating State, Armenia finds it necessary to call upon all OSCE participating States to be principled in their positions. If there is a will and desire to fix the situation, effective measures have to be implemented to that end and respect of the 1994 ceasefire regime must be enforced upon Azerbaijan.

Finally, one of the OSCE participating States, Turkey, which often recalls its membership in the Minsk Group, is acting from a position of inciting a great war in the region and is explicitly encouraging the adventuristic policy of the Azerbaijani leadership. Azerbaijan is bragging about its alleged victory and Turkey congratulates it on that occasion, while the international community condemns the use of force in Nagorno-Karabakh, although only in words. Turkey is the only

country to provide unwavering support for Azerbaijani adventurism. The statements made by Ankara before and after this situation, through which this country seems to compete with Azerbaijan with its anti-Armenian stance, can form a new hotbed of tension in the region, something of which Turkey has experience in the Near East. All those who wished to see Turkey among the mediators now understand that the country, having adopted the approach of the so-called "blood-kinship security", should be completely kept away from the Karabakh conflict resolution process.

To conclude, I would like to once again thank you for being here and express my hope that my messages and concerns will be heard in your capitals for the sake of pan-European peace and security.

United Nations A/70/821–S/2016/335

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Security Council

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13 April 2016
English
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General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 37
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Identical letters dated 30 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of February 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the seventieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf Salam
Permanent Representative

16-06083 (E) 180416 180416

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Annex to the identical letters dated 30 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
3 February 2016	1000 1025	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, the Israeli enemy fired light and medium automatic weapons in the area around the Summaqah post.
6 February 2016	0940	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the Kafr Killa-Udaysah road, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles appeared and inspected the technical fence. One of the patrol members aimed the weapon mounted on the vehicle in the direction of Lebanese territory. The patrol left in the direction of occupied territory at 1050 hours.
10 February 2016	1140	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, between the Ramta and Summaqah posts, the Israeli enemy set off two explosions that were heard on the Lebanese side.
	1250	On the outskirts of the town of Kafr Shuba at Bastrah near position 34-4 of the Indian contingent of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), while herder Wisam Abdul'al was herding livestock, an Israeli enemy patrol violated the line of withdrawal, proceeding some 181 metres into Lebanese territory, and led some 225 goats into occupied territory. On 11 February 2016 at 0030 hours, the Israeli enemy returned 134 goats at point B-57 (Aytarun), keeping 91 goats.
11 February 2016	2130 2145	The Israeli enemy fired two flares over the occupied Shab'a Farms.
12 February 2016	0915	At Zabdin Farm inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, an Israeli enemy Merkava tank appeared. Its crew released camouflage smoke around the area.
	1330	On the outskirts of the town of Wazzani, opposite the spot where Bassam and Ja'far Mustafa were herding livestock, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Defender vehicle appeared in occupied territory. Three personnel disembarked and launched two percussion bombs and three smoke bombs in the direction of the two herders. The bombs landed inside Lebanese territory without causing injury.
13 February 2016	0830	On the outskirts of the town of Wazzani, opposite the spot where Bassam and Ja'far Mustafa, and Yusuf Muhammad, were herding livestock approximately 100 metres from the technical fence, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles appeared in occupied territory. Three personnel disembarked and launched three smoke bombs in the direction of the herders. The bombs landed inside Lebanese territory without causing injury.
15 February 2016	0900	At Zabdin Farm inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, the Israeli enemy bulldozed land and uprooted olive and oak trees next to two of its positions, using a D9 bulldozer escorted by three Merkava tanks and two Hummer vehicles. The Israeli enemy finished its activities at 1615 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1110	From inside occupied Palestinian territory opposite Labbunah, Israeli enemy soldiers in the Jall al-Alam position aimed their weapons at a Lebanese Army patrol.
	1140	From inside occupied Palestinian territory opposite Labbunah, the Israeli enemy launched a smoke bomb from its Jall al-Alam position towards the dirt road leading to the aforementioned position alongside a Lebanese Army patrol that was conducting a routine border reconnaissance mission. There were no injuries.
16 February 2016	1030	At Zabdin Farm inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, the Israeli enemy continued the work it had begun on 15 February 2016, using three D9 bulldozers escorted by a patrol comprising three Merkava tanks and two Hummer vehicles. The Israeli enemy finished its activities at 1530 hours.
17 February 2016	1030	From inside occupied Palestinian territory, near the Israeli Jall al-Alam position opposite Labbunah, an Israeli enemy patrol launched a camouflage smoke bomb that landed on the occupied side while a Lebanese Army patrol was present on the Lebanese side. The smoke caused a soldier to become ill.
18 February 2016	1430	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the Kafr Killa-Udaysah road, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising three Hummer vehicles and a Defender vehicle appeared. Some 12 personnel disembarked, three of whom aimed their personal weapons in the direction of passers-by on the Lebanese side. The enemy patrol left in the direction of occupied territory at 1500 hours.
24 February 2016	0750 1000	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, in the area around the Ruwaysat al-Alam post, several bursts of medium automatic-weapon fire were heard.
	0900	At Zabdin Farm inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, the Israeli enemy bulldozed forested land and fortified its position at that location, using a D9 bulldozer and a trench digger escorted by a patrol comprising a Merkava tank, a personnel carrier, three Defender vehicles and a Hummer vehicle. At 1745 hours, the Israeli enemy finished its activities and the vehicles and the patrol left in the direction of the Zabdin post.
	1336	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Memugan vehicle and four personnel violated the line of withdrawal in the occupied northern part of the town of Ghajar, towards the Wazzani-Abbasiyah area. It observed Lebanese territory for two minutes before returning in the direction of the town of Ghajar.
	1910	The Israeli enemy fired a flare over the Radar post. In addition, several bursts of medium-weapon fire were heard area around the aforementioned post.
25 February 2016	0930	At Zabdin Farm inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, the Israeli enemy used a D9 bulldozer and a Poclain trench digger to bulldoze forested land. Those vehicles were escorted by a patrol comprising a Merkava tank, an armoured personnel carrier, two Defender vehicles and three Hummer vehicles. At 1700 hours, the Israeli enemy finished its activities and the enemy patrol left in the direction of occupied territory.
	1225	At Sheikh Abbad-Hula, as the Lebanese Army was conducting a patrol, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle appeared. Four soldiers disembarked, one of whom took photographs and aimed a weapon in the direction of the Lebanese Army patrol. They also made obscene gestures at our soldiers. The enemy patrol left in the direction of occupied territory at 1240 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
26 February 2016	0830 1000	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, the Israeli enemy fired light automatic weapons from inside the Zabdin post in the direction of the surrounding area.
27 February 2016	0930	Inside occupied territory, at the Misgav Am settlement opposite the town of Udaysah, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Defender vehicle and two civilian automobiles appeared. Patrol personnel raised a camera on a five-metre pole mounted on the Defender vehicle and pointed it in the direction of Lebanese territory.
	2125 2145	The Israeli enemy fired four flares over the Radar position inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
28 February 2016	1630 1745	Several explosions were heard from inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1700	Opposite Hasan Gate position 2, at Kafr Shuba, six cows crossed the line of withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territory into Lebanese territory. They left at 1730 hours.
29 February 2016	1100 1600	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, the Israeli enemy used four bulldozers to bulldoze dirt and trees on the road at its Zabdin post.

Sea violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 February 2016	2048	From inside Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a period of 10 seconds.
2 February 2016	1555	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011, proceeding some 250 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a three-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2155	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 300 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a five-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
3 February 2016	1540	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 130 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a 27-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
4 February 2016	1235	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 370 metres into Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1553	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 300 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a three-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
5 February 2016	1610	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 185 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a seven-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
7 February 2016	1023	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 185 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a two-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1027	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 241 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a three-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
8 February 2016	1655	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 277 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a three-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2125	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a period of 30 seconds.
10 February 2016	1016	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 297 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a period of one hour. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1124	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011, proceeding some 270 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a 54-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1234	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 240 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a period of two hours and three minutes. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1503	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 271 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a period of one hour and 10 minutes. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1628	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 296 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a seven-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1830 1902	From inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for three periods of 20 seconds, 30 seconds and 90 seconds, respectively.
	1832	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 445 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a four-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1838	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 480 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a six-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1850	Off Ra's Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch fired a flare inside Lebanese territorial waters between the fourth and fifth buoys.
	1859	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 420 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a seven-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
11 February 2016	1015	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 460 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a two-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1135	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 482 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a 21-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1228	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 407 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a 16-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1656	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 185 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a two-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
12 February 2016	0857	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 280 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a one-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1621	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 300 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a four-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
13 February 2016	1707	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 185 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a two-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
14 February 2016	1020	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011, proceeding some 203 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a four-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1651	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 259 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a three-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
16 February 2016	1000	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 222 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a six-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
19 February 2016	1609	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 260 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a two-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
25 February 2016	1100	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, two Israeli enemy military launches violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 204 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a 30-minute period. The launches then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1600	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011, proceeding some 203 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a two-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1900 1945	From inside occupied Palestinian territory at its Ra's al-Naqurah position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters three times, for 30 seconds, 10 seconds and two minutes, respectively.
26 February 2016	0630	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 296 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a 25-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1703	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 185 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a three-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1725	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 222 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a one-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
29 February 2016	0938	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011), proceeding some 222 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a one-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 February 2016	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 2310 hours over Naqurah.
	0925	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the Shab'a Farms. It circled over Riyaq, Zahlah and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1545 hours over Naqurah.
3 February 2016	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 1730 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1130	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2200 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
4 February 2016	0005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the Sha'ba Farms. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0600 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1110	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1405 hours over the sea off Shikka.
	1205	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and Riyaq before leaving at 0015 hours on 5 February 2016 over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1300	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Shikka, Arz and Jubayl before leaving at 1840 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1330	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. They circled over the sea off Shikka and Tripoli before leaving at 1555 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1355	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Beirut and Juniyah before leaving at 1610 hours over the sea off Tripoli.
5 February 2016	1815	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Beirut. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1920 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
8 February 2016	1000	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1100 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
	1103	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1100 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1950	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Ra's al-Naqurah. They released 21 decoy flares over Lebanese territorial waters before leaving at 2045 hours over the sea off Ra's al-Naqurah.
	2334	Eight Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over Baalbek before leaving at 2345 hours over the sea off Rumaylah.
9 February 2016	0755	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda and Matn before leaving at 1800 hours over Rumaysh.
12 February 2016	0930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Beirut. It circled over the sea off Beirut and Juniyah before leaving at 1035 hours over the sea off Shikka.
	1230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1335 hours over Rumaysh.
	1340	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1655 hours over Kafr Killa.
13 February 2016	0300	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 0655 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1145 hours over Rumaysh.
14 February 2016	0815	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1600 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
15 February 2016	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1415 hours over Rumaysh.
	0900	Two Israeli enemy helicopters circled over the occupied Sha'ba Farms.
	1025	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1215 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
	1530	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the Sha'ba Farms. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2215 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
16 February 2016	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the Shab'a Farms. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, the Western Bekaa, Rashayya and Hasbayya before leaving at 1420 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0945	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the Shab'a Farms. It circled over Rashayya and Hasbayya before leaving at 1025 hours over the Shab'a Farms.
	1030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1200 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2255 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1715	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1750 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
	1735	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They left Lebanese airspace at 1750 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
17 February 2016	0640	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa, Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 2340 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the North before leaving at 1530 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Iqlim al-Kharrub and the South before leaving at 1605 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2215	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 0505 hours on 18 February 2016 over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
18 February 2016	0920	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1035 hours over Naqurah.
	1545	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2300 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
19 February 2016	0930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1925 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
23 February 2016	1130	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1300 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
24 February 2016	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1725 hours over Aytarun.
	0750 1000	Israeli enemy helicopters circled over the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Iqlim al-Kharrub and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1435 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1035	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Damur. It left at 1050 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1455	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1800 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1500	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1535 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1625	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1825 hours over Kafr Killa.
25 February 2016	0500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Beirut and its suburbs and the Batrun and Jubayl districts before leaving at 1100 hours over Rumaysh.
26 February 2016	1035	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1425 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
28 February 2016	0920	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1745 hours over Naqurah.
	1230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1700 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1425	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over Udaysah, Kafr Killa, Blida and Mays al-Jabal before leaving at 1535 hours.
29 February 2016	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1525 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0910	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1600 hours over Rumaysh.
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Shikka and Batrun before leaving at 1450 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Iqlim al-Kharrub and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 0215 hours on 1 March 2016 over Naqurah.

United Nations A/70/822–S/2016/316

General Assembly
Security Council

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English
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General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 108
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Seventy-first year
Security Council

Identical letters dated 5 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to apprise you of the terrorist attacks that occurred in the cities of Aleppo and Dayr al-Zawr in which armed terrorist groups indiscriminately fired shells at peaceful residential neighbourhoods.

In the morning of Tuesday, 5 April 2016, at rush hour, armed terrorist groups indiscriminately fired dozens of missiles and mortar shells at the Shaykh Maqsud neighbourhood and other peaceful neighbourhoods nearby in Aleppo city. The attack was carried out by the Nusrah Front and other armed terrorist groups, including the so-called Army of Conquest, Ahrar al-Sham and the Northern Front, that are entrenched in the areas around Aleppo city. Those groups, which some like to refer to as moderate armed groups, are commanded from operation rooms in Turkey. Preliminary estimates indicate that 15 civilians were killed and more than 100 others, including women, children and elderly persons, sustained injuries of varying severity. Three residential buildings in the Shaykh Maqsud neighbourhood collapsed as a result of the terrorists' indiscriminate shelling; efforts are currently under way to rescue civilians trapped under the rubble. The indiscriminate shelling also caused severe material damage to homes, stores and infrastructure.

On Monday, 4 April 2016, terrorist from the Nusrah Front and other armed terrorist groups attacked the towns of Fu'ah and Kafraya in the Aleppo countryside and the Shaykh Maqsud neighbourhood of Aleppo city. Eight civilians were killed and more than 20 others sustained various injuries, while damage of varying severity was caused to property and infrastructure. In Dayr al-Zawr, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorists and their supporters bombarded civilians in the Juwrah and Qusur neighbourhoods, killing five civilians and injuring dozens of defenceless persons. The attack also caused material damage to private and public property. In addition, ISIL terrorists attacked the Dayr al-Zawr civilian airport with mustard gas, causing cases of asphyxiation among the ranks of those defending the airport.

The indiscriminate shelling of peaceful Syrian residential neighbourhoods that occurred yesterday and today is a continuation of the terrorist attacks that have been directed against many Syrian cities. It is also a continuation of the ongoing murder committed and destruction caused by "non-State armed groups" — the name invented by certain States and actors to cover up the cooperation, funding and support that they provide to armed terrorist groups — and a blatant attempt to circumvent the resolutions of the Security Council concerning counter-terrorism.

In addition, those armed terrorist groups, regardless of their loyalties, which are now known to all, are striving to thwart the measures adopted by the United Nations to halt combat operations in Syria. It should be noted that the armed terrorist groups have committed hundreds of violations during this period.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms that it abides by the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the cessation of combat operations and stresses that the Council must take preventive measures against the regimes and Governments of those States that support and finance terrorism, in implementation of its relevant resolutions, including resolutions 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015).

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the seventieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 108, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/70/823–S/2016/324

General Assembly
Security Council

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12 April 2016

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General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 34
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 4 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of remarks made by a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 2 April 2016 with regard to the unjustifiable disregard by the Security Council of the request by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to place the issue of the United States joint military exercises on the agenda of the Security Council (see annex).*

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ja** Song Nam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.

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Annex to the letter dated 4 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Remarks made by a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Pyongyang, April 2 (KCNA) -- A spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK on Saturday, 2 April 2016 gave an answer to a question put by KCNA as regards the fact that the UN Security Council is ignoring the complaint about the ongoing U.S.-south Korea joint military drills.

The DPRK demanded the UNSC convene an urgent meeting in connection with the aggressive joint military drills Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 16 kicked off by the U.S. despite the DPRK's warning and the international community's unanimous condemnation.

The spokesman said the DPRK filed the complaint as the largest-ever sabre-rattling is disturbing international peace and security and wantonly violating the principle of respect for sovereignty stipulated in the UN Chapter in its scale and nature, adding:

The action taken by the UNSC to disregard the complaint about the above-said joint war drills brought into bolder relief that it has been reduced to a political tool loyal to the U.S. as it discarded its mission of preserving peace and security and the impartiality which keeps alive its activities as an international organization.

It is the UNSC which seconds the U.S. high-handed and arbitrary practices, failing to bring up for discussion its war for aggression, genocide and state-sponsored terrorism.

The UNSC has lost political and legal justification or moral decency to slap any sanctions against the DPRK as it has turned a blind eye to the U.S. nuclear threats to the DPRK caused by the joint military exercises for over a half a century.

The DPRK will continue exercising its legitimate right to self-defence by its own efforts now that the U.S. doesn't discontinue the nuclear war games, a vivid manifestation of the U.S. hostile policy towards the DPRK, and the UNSC disregards it though it is obliged to protect global peace and security.

The DPRK has already had access to self-defensive deterrent capable of frustrating any U.S. nuclear threat, blackmail and provocation and will further bolster it up both in quality and quantity as the days go by. -0-

United Nations A/70/824

General Assembly

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Seventieth session
Agenda item 125
Global health and foreign policy

Strengthening the global health architecture: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Background

1. On 3 April 2015, I commissioned the High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises to undertake a wide range of consultations and to make recommendations to strengthen national and international systems to prevent and manage future health crises, taking into account lessons learned from the response to the outbreak of Ebola virus disease in West Africa from 2014 to 2015. In early 2016, the Panel submitted its report, entitled "Protecting humanity from future health crises" (A/70/723). I thank and congratulate President of the United Republic of Tanzania Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete and the other members of the Panel for their considered report, which was presented after widespread consultations, including with representatives from the affected countries and communities, the United Nations system, multilateral and bilateral financial institutions, non-governmental organizations, countries supporting the response effort, other Member States, health-care providers, academic and research institutions, the private sector and other experts.

2. Many of the Panel's recommendations are directed towards the United Nations system. Some are specifically directed to the World Health Organization (WHO), given the specific focus of the Panel's work. I have closely reviewed those recommendations with the Director General of WHO and with the leaders of other United Nations system entities. The present report contains my suggestions on ways to implement the recommendations of the Panel. I have outlined activities that have been initiated or are planned in connection with the recommendations. I have also commented on recommendations that relate to the work of the General Assembly or the World Health Assembly, as well as to the work of other actors, including regional organizations, financial institutions and the private sector. I invite the

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General Assembly to consider the present report when it reviews the report of the High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises.

II. Introduction

3. As the Ebola outbreak unfolded in 2014, it became clear that no one country or organization had the resources to stem the tide of the crisis. Uncertainty, fear and a lack of capacity and preparedness contributed to an ineffective and delayed response. The Governments of the affected countries called upon the United Nations to lead the coordination of the international response to the Ebola outbreak. Following consultation with the Director General of WHO, I informed Member States in my identical letters to the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council of 17 September 2014 (A/69/389-S/2014/679) that the United Nations, in support of national efforts, would do everything it could to bring an end to the crisis and would provide the strategic leadership, diverse capacity and operational framework for the action necessary to harness international efforts in a unified and coherent manner in order to manage the crisis effectively and efficiently. In that regard, I established the first-ever emergency health mission, the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER). The General Assembly welcomed the establishment of UNMEER and played a critical role in sustaining the political and financial support required to contain the outbreak.

4. Harnessing the operational capabilities of the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, UNMEER brought critical political engagement and a regional coordination capacity to the crisis. Member States took significant and robust action in deploying their national capacities to assist the affected countries of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. With remarkable courageous action taken by local communities, Governments and international partners, the spread of Ebola was gradually contained.

5. As at April 2016, more than 28,600 people have been infected with Ebola and more than 11,300 people have died from the virus. Many infected early on during the outbreak were unable to access high-quality care. The Ebola crisis went far beyond a health emergency. It affected economies, trade, livelihoods and employment, and reversed hard-won progress in the economic and development spheres. It also diverted resources from other critical services, leaving those affected in a more vulnerable state.

6. While the response measures outlined above provided important support, it is clear that the world needs a more robust and effective global health architecture with strong and accountable leadership to deal with health crises, including pandemics. Too many lives in West Africa were lost that could otherwise have been saved with a stronger global and national health crisis prevention and response system.

7. To address that need, I established the High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises to identify high-level policy recommendations that would enable the global community to be better prepared to prevent and respond to health crises.

Recommendations relating to the World Health Organization

8. In its report, the Panel stated that it was convinced that there was no substitute for a single global health leader with significant resources to determine and execute global health priorities, and that the World Health Organization should become that leader. I agree with that finding and support the Panel's recommendation for establishing a dedicated capacity within WHO for emergency preparedness and response with strong senior leadership. Health crises caused by epidemics and pandemics are a threat to global public health and require a coordinated global response. WHO is the single organization with the appropriate experience and technical capacity to undertake this responsibility. At the same time, I believe that WHO needs to reposition itself as an operational organization, clarifying its reporting lines and adjusting its business processes so that it can perform its operational role most effectively during times of health crises.

9. WHO has a critical leadership role to play in preventing and responding to epidemics and outbreaks such as Ebola and Zika. It is imperative in such health crises, or in threats of an outbreak, that WHO operates in an independent and neutral manner and is not subject to any political pressure that may affect the transparency of its communication and reporting. If that independence is compromised, it may have an impact upon global public health and increase the vulnerability of populations around the world.

10. The Director General of WHO has informed me that the organization is establishing a single programme on outbreaks and emergencies, with one workforce, one budget, one set of rules and processes and one clear line of authority. The new programme is designed to be comprehensive, addressing all hazards flexibly and rapidly, together with all relevant partners, including humanitarian actors. The Panel underlined that WHO cannot act in isolation in responding to a health crisis and must also engage its fellow Inter-Agency Standing Committee members and all relevant responders, including in the context of the International Health Regulations (2005).

11. No humanitarian organization can effectively respond to an emergency unless there is a clear line of direct command from its executive head to its staff in the field, and unless the management of the organization is able to operate under the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, responding directly to the greatest needs without hindrance. Those operational principles have served the United Nations and its partners well in humanitarian crises. Having closely consulted with the Director General of WHO on the findings of the Panel, I consider that for significant outbreaks and health emergencies, staff managing those health crises should report directly through the Executive Director of the WHO Outbreaks and Health Emergencies Programme to the Director General, who is ultimately responsible.

12. The Panel observed that there was a close relationship between compliance with the core capacity requirements of the International Health Regulations and the wider improvement of health systems. It believed that compliance with those requirements was too important to rely entirely on a system of self-reporting. I support the Panel's findings and its emphasis on the critical importance of establishing the core capacities required by the Regulations at the country level as the primary basis for the prevention of and preparedness for health crises. As we witnessed in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone during the Ebola outbreak, the

absence of those capacities has a significant impact upon the effectiveness of any response to a health crisis.

13. I therefore support the Panel's recommendations for strengthening the periodic review of compliance with the core capacity requirements of the International Health Regulations. A more credible and reliable process will enable vulnerable countries to highlight gaps and receive appropriate support from the international community. To that end, I encourage member States of WHO to give serious consideration to strengthening the periodic review process of the core capacity requirements when they review the recommendations of the Review Committee on the Role of the International Health Regulations (2005) in the Ebola Outbreak and Response. It will be important, in addition to the self-assessment by countries of their own core capacities, for WHO to similarly coordinate objective assessments on an annually rotating basis for all countries, which can then be reviewed by the organization's member States. WHO will shortly convene relevant actors, including the Chair of the Global Health Security Agenda, to agree on common indicators and assessment templates. Those measures will be critical for mobilizing the necessary international support to assist with compliance by all countries. An absence of compliance by just one country could have an impact upon public health globally.

Recommendations relating to the United Nations system and its Inter-Agency Standing Committee partners

14. The findings of the lessons-learned exercise for UNMEER highlighted the importance of a "whole of system" response to a health crisis, including the necessary high-level political engagement for global public health. Moreover, the non-health impacts of epidemics or outbreaks underscore the value of immediate engagement by other parts of the United Nations system. The United Nations must activate and sustain its capacity to coordinate a unified response and mobilize an operational platform across multiple countries in an expedited manner commensurate with the response required by the crisis. In that regard, following the Panel's recommendation for strengthened early engagement by my office in health crises, the Director General of WHO and I have agreed that I will be formally informed of the response to Grade 2 or Grade 3 outbreaks. WHO is a member of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the Director General of WHO will keep the Committee informed of emerging health outbreaks with a view towards addressing when greater support will be required from the rest of the United Nations system in support of the organization's efforts.

15. The importance of having transparent command of the response strategy was evident during the deployment of UNMEER. While no international response can control the assets of organizations and actors of varying origins with varying donor obligations and reporting requirements, it is vital that there be a strong degree of command over the response priorities and strategies. Where needed, a coordinator will be appointed through existing Inter-Agency Standing Committee structures and mechanisms. The coordinator should have a strong emergency risk management response and emergency health background in order to provide effective strategic and operational coordination, as well as leadership, of the United Nations system's response to a health crisis. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat will provide its standard support to the designated coordinator, and the WHO Outbreaks and Health Emergencies Programme will provide overall technical guidance and advice. I will also be informed of humanitarian and other

factors contributing to those threats in situations in which a non-health intervention is deemed critical.

16. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee has the strongest experience in coordinating international response to emergencies. It has developed tools, mechanisms, partnerships and policies to coordinate large-scale and context-appropriate humanitarian responses. That mechanism remains the foundation of the cross-sectoral response coordinated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Operating in an epidemic context presents major challenges that are not necessarily prevalent in other emergencies. I encourage the members of the Committee to make bold commitments at the World Humanitarian Summit to enhance the robustness, timeliness and coordination of their capacities to address global health crises in collaboration with development actors and the private sector.

17. The critical guidance and identification of cross-sectoral strategies in relation to health concerns by WHO will be incorporated into the standard operating procedures for responding to health emergencies. That includes supply chain logistics related to health responses by national and international actors, which cannot be underestimated and can contribute significantly to saving lives. United Nations agencies such as the World Food Programme and the United Nations Children's Fund are working closely with WHO to ensure that arrangements and governance structures are agreed and tested in 2016 in preparedness for future responses. Moreover, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and WHO have begun planning for stronger, more predictable coordination mechanisms in health crises.

18. I encourage my Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator to ensure the strong engagement of United Nations humanitarian agencies at an early stage of a health crisis through rapid assessments of humanitarian and access needs. To that end, the Director General of WHO and the Emergency Relief Coordinator will integrate health and humanitarian emergency trigger systems in 2016 to ensure that Inter-Agency Standing Committee partners are prepared for an immediate humanitarian response where needed in an outbreak situation. Every health crisis classified as Grade 2 or Grade 3, in accordance with the WHO Emergency Response Framework, should automatically trigger an Inter-Agency Standing Committee cross-sectoral initial rapid assessment.

19. The impact of health and humanitarian crises on women has been amply documented. The Panel observed that, since women tend to act as primary caregivers, they are on the front lines of the spread of disease and may also be disproportionately affected by the loss of their livelihoods. I support the recommendation of the Panel to all stakeholders to engage women in all levels of planning and operations to ensure preparedness and response to crises. In addition, I am committed to ensuring the full engagement of women in decision-making at all levels of planning and operations in the United Nations system.

Recommendations relating to national actors

20. The Panel observed that States are the primary actors responsible and accountable for responding to a health crisis and are best placed to contain outbreaks. It also identified the link between shortfalls in country preparedness, surveillance and response and poor compliance with the core capacities

requirements of the International Health Regulations. I support the Panel's recommendation for States parties to the International Health Regulations to urgently ensure full compliance with the core capacity requirements. I urge international support for vulnerable developing countries to achieve that outcome. It will also be important for the Governments of those countries to provide strong leadership and commitment by significantly increasing the amount of domestic resources devoted to ensuring compliance with the International Health Regulations.

21. The Panel recommended the inclusion of health crises into national disaster risk-reduction preparedness and response mechanisms and plans. While much already has been invested by national and international actors into national disaster preparedness plans and mechanisms, I encourage all Governments to undertake that measure, which is aligned with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 agreed to by Member States in 2015. That would be the most appropriate tool and mechanism for a country-led multisectoral response to a health crisis and its impacts upon populations, and would avoid a duplication of preparedness plans and mechanisms for different contingency scenarios. I also support the recommendation that those processes be led at the highest political level in countries. I strongly encourage Governments to engage with my Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator and the United Nations country teams and humanitarian country teams, including WHO, in their capitals to coordinate joint preparedness plans for those contingencies.

22. Following its visits to Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Panel observed the vital importance of communities in combating health crises. Building and strengthening community public health capacities and building trust between authorities and communities are two critical national investment measures that can significantly contribute to prevention, preparedness and response. The Panel found that community sensitization efforts were poorly planned and did not take into account the legitimacy of local concerns, which contributed to a lack of trust between communities and national and international responders. That hindered the response to Ebola and may have contributed to its spread. However, when the problems were identified, significant steps were taken to better engage various community leaders and reduce the spread of the disease. Had those measures been taken before the onset of Ebola, we would have likely seen a much more effective response and fewer lives lost.

23. I encourage Governments to engage with United Nations partners in their countries, including WHO, to strengthen public health outreach and deepen their engagement with communities. United Nations partners will also be ready to facilitate engagement with other countries where similar practices are already under way. The communities in the three most affected countries were a major factor in containing the spread of Ebola. I also encourage Governments to invest more in the training of health professionals and to establish appropriate community health worker systems. In that regard, I look forward to the findings of the High-level Commission on Health Employment and Economic Growth.

Recommendations relating to regional and subregional actors

24. The Panel noted that regional and subregional organizations played important and innovative roles in the response to the Ebola crisis and can play an important role in responding to health crises, as outbreaks often cross borders. Regional

cooperation is imperative in order to improve cross-border surveillance, case monitoring and contact tracing. Those arrangements and agreements must be established and regularly tested in simulations as a critical preparedness measure if they are to effectively halt an epidemic. I endorse the recommendation of the Panel for regional and subregional organizations to develop or strengthen standing capacities to monitor, prevent and respond to health crises and to coordinate the sharing of existing capacities in the region. WHO stands ready to support those efforts and I urge regional and subregional organizations to take advantage of that support.

Recommendations relating to sustainable development

25. The Panel drew a close connection between the strengthening of health systems and other development priorities. The strengthening of health systems is the cornerstone for combating the spread of disease, but a functioning health system must be combined with strategic development in related sectors. The absence of development in water and sanitation, education, infrastructure or social services, for example, can significantly affect the vulnerability of populations to disease and the ability of health actors to provide adequate health care services. Following the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 70/1, entitled "Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the United Nations and partners have an extraordinary opportunity to ensure that health systems are strengthened with the requisite development in related sectors. I recommend that the Assembly consider the most appropriate means of ensuring that the strengthening of health systems related to the core capacity priorities of the International Health Regulations are integrated into the indicators for the Sustainable Development Goals.

Recommendations relating to research and development

26. The Panel observed that there was a serious shortfall in research and development investment in vaccines and therapeutics for neglected communicable diseases that pose an initial threat primarily to developing countries, but could lead to a widespread outbreak or epidemic. I support the Panel's recommendation that WHO be responsible for coordinating the prioritization of global research and development efforts for neglected diseases that pose the greatest threat of turning into health crises.

27. The Panel called on WHO to lead efforts in assisting developing countries in building research and manufacturing capacities for vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics, including through South-South cooperation. I strongly support that recommendation and call on all stakeholders in the public and private sector to consider that support a global public health good. Assistance in expanding research and manufacturing capacities would include developing and supporting research for biological and social science programmes, veterinary services and engineering and related fields.

Recommendations relating to financing

28. In times of a global public health threat or crisis, a single leader is particularly critical in order to avoid duplication and ensure an effective response. I reiterate that there is no organization that is better positioned to play that leadership role than

WHO. However, I believe that WHO needs to have adequate resources to fulfil the roles expected of it.

29. Since 2006, the United Nations agencies and their partners have greatly benefited from predictable allocations from the Central Emergency Response Fund to rapidly respond within a strategic, coordinated framework to humanitarian emergencies. Health crises and emergencies will require a significant dedicated fund to deploy and operationalize large-scale technical teams under the coordination and strategic command of WHO. In May 2015, the World Health Assembly decided to establish the Contingency Fund for Emergencies. Unlike the broader scope of the Response Fund, the Contingency Fund for Emergencies is established for the specific purpose of providing the resources necessary to rapidly scale up the initial response by WHO to outbreaks and emergencies with health consequences. An early and well-funded health response will be critical for saving lives of affected populations. I encourage Member States to ensure that the Contingency Fund is adequately funded and regularly replenished and that all United Nations entities participating in a response to a health crisis can have access to funding when needed.

30. Donors will need to support the strengthening of health systems more strategically. In addition, donors will need to support universal and equitable access to quality health care in more vulnerable countries where lack of income, poor communication and transportation lines, ill-equipped facilities and inadequate numbers of health-care professionals often mean the difference between life and death. Much has been achieved through international support for disease eradication programmes. Donors have generously contributed to programmes dedicated to specific health indicators. As the Panel stated, however, that support does not adequately extend to assisting Governments to sustainably develop health systems, nor are those "vertical" programmes broadly supporting health care systems in a consistent manner. I note that other sectors that contribute to responses to health crises, such as water, sanitation, hygiene, nutrition and protection, also need to receive adequate resources. I encourage donors and global and regional financial institutions, together with WHO and other relevant United Nations agencies, to initiate a strategic discussion and plan of action to provide adequate additional support to Governments to strengthen health systems.

31. On 29 August 2014, the Presidents of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone wrote to me stating that their countries faced virtual economic sanctions and trade embargos that would aggravate the effect of the outbreak on their economies and stifle their attempts to control the epidemic (see S/2014/669). The Panel agreed that restrictions imposed at border crossings and on trade, sometimes potentially in contravention of the International Health Regulations, amplify the impact of disease outbreaks. It added that the consequences of an economic contraction caused by a disease can be more far-reaching and devastating than the outbreak itself. I therefore recommend that the World Trade Organization and WHO work together to consider how to mitigate the threat of such unilateral measures. Unless those risks are addressed, I am concerned that they may influence political decision-making with respect to health crises.

32. Access to predictable rapid funding by affected Governments and other national and international response actors is key to the success of a health emergency response and will contribute significantly to saving lives. In addition to

supporting critical activities, predictable funding is important in order to assist response leaders in better coordinating the development and implementation of a common strategy. The Panel noted that the absence of reliable funding affects the ability of authorities to prevent the spread of disease. In that connection, I strongly support the World Bank's proposal for a pandemic emergency financing facility and its innovative use of new financing sources. I recommend that donors help the World Bank to activate that fund as soon as possible.

Recommendations relating to follow-up and implementation

33. Outbreaks of communicable diseases pose a significant threat to global health security and require an immediate and robust response at the highest political level. In that regard, I note that both the Panel and the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel of WHO have recommended mechanisms for global health issues to be escalated to the political level. The importance of political leadership in addressing health crises at both national and international levels has been demonstrated by several recent communicable disease outbreaks. A large-scale health crisis can affect all sectors of society. Responses can often overlook or inadequately address marginalized and otherwise vulnerable groups. A response requires strong national political leadership to ensure that those challenges are adequately addressed.

34. At the national level, preparedness, surveillance and response efforts for communicable disease outbreaks should be led at the highest political level commensurate with the health outbreak. The Panel observed that concerns about possible outbreaks raised by health ministries at the national level often are not given the priority they deserve, or are downplayed for political reasons. On the other hand, engagement in a response to a health crisis by the political leadership at the highest levels helps to effectively mobilize all national response actors and encourage cooperation to achieve faster results. The experience of Nigeria demonstrates how high-level political leadership, clear public communications and strong engagement with the communities were instrumental in ending the Ebola outbreak.

35. As demonstrated in the West Africa Ebola outbreak, the consequences of health crises go far beyond health. A response that adequately reflects the health, humanitarian and socioeconomic dimensions will require leadership from a central political authority whose remit includes all of those sectors.

36. In today's interconnected world, outbreaks of communicable diseases in any country pose a significant threat to all countries. Conversely, any country's failure to acknowledge or adequately respond to an outbreak puts at risk the lives of people across the globe. Greater awareness of threats to global health security at the political level will allow earlier efforts at international cooperation to counter threats.

37. Political leadership is also needed to ensure effective global preparedness through continuing oversight of the implementation of core capacities and other preparedness measures and by directing international assistance where it is most needed. Effective monitoring is needed to maintain the momentum required to strengthen the global health architecture. Regular follow-up can help to keep the issue of global health security on the international agenda to better protect the world from pandemics.

38. In the light of the grave threat posed by pandemics, I support the Panel's suggestion that the General Assembly regularly raise global health concerns at the political level. In addition, those concerns can also be examined by the Economic and Social Council, as appropriate.

39. The Panel recommends the establishment by the General Assembly of a high-level council on global public health crises comprising 45 to 50 Member States that would cover three functions: first, the council would monitor the political and other non-health issues related to the prevention of and preparedness for major health crises; second, it would monitor the implementation of relevant recommendations; third, it would support preparations for a summit on global public health crises.

40. I do not support the recommendation to establish a high-level council on global public health crises. In my view, the functions proposed for the council could be covered through more frequent exchanges between the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council on the one hand and the annual World Health Assembly on the other. In addition, the establishment of such a council might have significant resource implications.

41. I will be fully engaged in the implementation of the Panel's recommendations as they relate to the United Nations system and, when necessary, will bring relevant issues to the notice of the General Assembly. To assist in that regard, I am establishing, within existing resources a global health crises task force for a period of one year. The task force will be led by the Deputy Secretary-General, and I will also invite WHO and the World Bank to serve as co-leads for the task force. The task force will include senior-level officials from international organizations within the United Nations system. Given that preparedness for and response to global public health crises involves actors beyond the United Nations, the task force will also include independent specialists in international health, finance and trade, as well as persons with appropriate expertise from civil society and non-governmental organizations.

III. Conclusion

Wake-up call

42. With the increasing movement of people and populations throughout the world, and with climate change creating conditions that facilitate the spread of disease, no country is immune from a disease outbreak, no matter where it emerges. The recent Zika outbreak is evidence of that disquieting truth.

43. I believe that the threat to millions of lives of a pandemic has so far been underestimated, as has the importance of global preparedness and capacity. I recognize that, in the current global political and economic environment, many priorities place pressure on limited resources. However, unless we act now to strengthen the public health capacities of countries, to empower WHO, the United Nations and other responders and to invest to prevent disease outbreaks, the next health crisis may cause even greater devastation than the Ebola outbreak. I urge the General Assembly to seriously commit to addressing these recommendations.

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Question of Cyprus

Oceans and the law of the sea

Letter dated 7 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to express my Government's grave disappointment and concern over a press statement issued by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 25 March 2016, which constitutes yet another example of Turkey's continued provocative and destabilizing attitude vis-à-vis the Republic of Cyprus.

The Republic of Cyprus, exercising its sovereign right, in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, has recently called for a third international tender for hydrocarbon exploration in its exclusive economic zone. The tender was published in the *Official Journal of the European Union* on 24 March 2016.

In its press statement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey continues to call into question the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus to an exclusive economic zone and its exploration and exploitation.

Turkey's deplorable position, based on an arbitrary interpretation of international treaties and conventions, is totally unfounded and lacks any legal basis. In addition, it constitutes further proof of its continuing refusal to comply with international law and relevant Security Council resolutions, especially resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984).

It would be redundant to underline once more that the Republic of Cyprus, a State Member of the United Nations, is fully entitled to legitimately exercise all its sovereign rights deriving from international law over both its land and marine territories, including the sovereign rights over its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, as guaranteed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was ratified by the Republic of Cyprus in 1988.

It is also regrettable that Turkey uses as a pretext for its assertions the "protection of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots". The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has repeatedly made it abundantly clear that Cyprus's natural wealth

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belongs to the people of Cyprus — that is to say, to all citizens of the Republic of Cyprus. Following the resolution of the Cyprus problem, all people of the island will reap the benefits of their country's natural resources.

The rights of the Turkish Cypriots will be best served in the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, which will allow all Cypriots to live in conditions of peace, dignity and prosperity. It is in this way that the exploitation of Cyprus's hydrocarbons will benefit all Cypriots and guarantee a prosperous future for generations to come.

Hence, it is in this direction that Turkey should be concentrating its efforts, adopting a constructive attitude towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem, which will result in the reunification of the country, its people, its economy and its institutions.

It will take several years before any financial benefits materialize from the exploitation of hydrocarbons in Cyprus's exclusive economic zone. It is therefore of utmost importance that the Cyprus problem be solved by then. We remain confident that this can be achieved, if the Turkish side shows the necessary goodwill and contributes positively and in a concrete way, within the agreed basis of the talks, to the negotiations under way in order to reach a solution in a timely manner.

Turkey's fulfilment of all its obligations arising from the Charter of the United Nations and international law is the only mutually beneficial path ahead. It is also the way forward for the island of Cyprus and its people to benefit from its natural wealth. There can be no doubt that it is also the step most conducive to fostering peace and stability in the wider eastern Mediterranean region.

The Government of Cyprus remains determined to uphold and protect its sovereign rights to explore and exploit its natural resources within its exclusive economic zone under international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, using all peaceful means at its disposal.

I therefore wish to reiterate my Government's request to you to convey to Turkey a firm message: that it must conform with international legality and honour its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, respect the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all States Member of the United Nations and contribute in a concrete way to the efforts for a settlement of the Cyprus problem and the promotion of regional peace and stability.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 44 and 79 (a), and of the Security Council and have it published on the website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, in the next *Law of the Sea Bulletin*.

(*Signed*) Nicholas **Emiliou**